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Welcome to the family! Marriage as 
business strategy in the Roman 
economy 
Introduction 
In every society, fiction has established a powerful bias against monetary considerations in social 
relationships. It is a recurring theme in countless songs, movies and books, from the classic ‘Sense 
and Sensibility’ and the less equivocal ‘How to marry a millionaire’ to the ‘Spiderman’-saga, that at 
some time, one must choose between wealth on the one hand and beauty or honesty on the other. 
Both apparently never occur in one and the same person, a remarkable feature which cleverly 
remains unexplained, and the lesson is invariably clear: one must reject base wealth in favor of 
higher personal qualities. Why exactly fictional society frowns upon marrying for money is never 
made clear, for to a rational mind the benefits of marrying into an affluent family are obvious. One 
possible explanation (apart from the unrealistic yet endlessly repeated ‘good will always prevail’) is 
that bride and groom are never the only people involved in the marriage.1 Parents on both sides 
usually try to influence their child’s choice, claiming that they know what is best for him or her. The 
result is often a conflict between non-economic pros, defended by the romantic and naive child, and 
economic cons brought up by the realistic and pragmatic parents. That authors and song-writers 
consistently side with the choice of the younger generation reflects the expected attitude of the 
target audience, which often to a large extent coincides with the people who face or will soon face 
similar choices.  
In real society however, the victory of romantic love over wealth is less guaranteed, especially when 
the decisional power of the family, and the parents in particular, outweighs the involvement of bride 
and groom and the importance of preserving or augmenting family possessions is duly recognized. 
Time and again, one can see how marriages are usually contracted between partners who are each 
other’s equals, both socially and economically, or who find a comfortable match between wealth and 
social status (i.e. impoverished aristocrats wedding nouveaux riches). The result of these 
considerations is a set of various marriage patterns and socially induced restrictions on partner 
choice, which can be traced in virtually every society. For Rome, these aspects of marriage have been 
thoroughly analyzed, in particular for the equestrian and senatorial elite. The importance of marital 
ties in forging political alliances or pooling and transferring wealth has received considerable 
attention.2 On the other hand, marriage patterns among non-aristocratic Romans, and the economic 
consequences of affiliation in particular, remain less well explored.3 This is no doubt to be related to 
the very tacit nature of the sources through which these Romans and their families appear before us, 
viz. epigraphical records. Inscriptions never explicitly reveal why exactly these two people decided to 
get married. Love and affection obviously must have played a (major?) role, but as with the 
prearranged marriages between aristocrats for political and economic motives, one cannot exclude 
similar, less romantic intentions.  
This assumption in particular applies to the marriages of merchants, artisans and other businessmen. 
Extensive analysis of business communities in other pre-industrial societies has shown how 
important marriage could be in advancing business improvement.4 With the family as a dynamic and 
fluid construct, continuously changing as members enter, leave and introduce outsiders, each 
alteration presents opportunities to augment the family’s resources, including tangible assets such as 
money, labor, production units and property, but also virtual capital, status and access to credit. 
Moreover, creating kinship linkages provides members entrance to different networks, in which 
commercial information can be circulated and dishonest behavior is strongly discouraged. 
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Businessmen identified these possibilities and often carefully selected, or were forced to do so by 
their family, those partners who would be able to support their economic ambitions. Obviously, the 
wealthier and more powerful a merchant family was, the more heavily the obligation lay on finding a 
suitable partner.  
This paper will argue that Roman businessmen, in the same way as their colleagues in medieval and 
early modern Europe did, profoundly grasped the economic rationale of marriage and used various 
strategies to accumulate wealth, create new trading opportunities and make business organization 
more efficient. Before analyzing the nature of these marriage patterns, we will first shortly consider 
the difficulties of tracing the ‘economic value’ of husbands, wives and their families. The second 
section will then analyze the economic advantages of marriage for a single family. Marriage as a tool 
to connect the interests of two merchant families will be discussed in the third part. The fourth 
section will explore the marital ties between merchants and aristocratic families. 
Invisible wives in the economy 
A straightforward analysis of Roman marriage as a business strategy is hampered by multiple 
shortcomings of the sources available. As we will mainly focus on epigraphy, most difficulties can be 
reduced to the particular nature of inscriptional evidence.  
 
First, inscriptions are heavily biased against the visibility of female economic activity. Paucity of 
occupational inscriptions is a problem economic historians are faced with for both sexes, but in 
particular limits the information available for the activities of married women. As for most societies 
up until the early 20th century, Roman women are far more often mentioned by their marital status 
instead of the profession they hold. Their participation in the economy, wide-spread though it may 
be, is often not reflected by the use of female occupational titles.5 Moreover, in the Roman empire 
as in most pre-industrial societies, women’s careers often lacked the formal structure in which men 
developed their trade: prolonged apprenticeship, membership in professional associations and hence 
the creation of an occupational identity were usually a male privilege.6 Historical records thus mostly 
cloud women’s professions, because contrary to the publicity of male labor, female activities are 
thought to belong to the private sphere of domesticity.7 Consequently, labor division within a single 
household usually remains invisible. 
 
Secondly, once we leave the better-documented equestrian and senatorial marital scene, detailed 
information on the true motives for marriage is virtually non-existent. Inscriptions usually tacitly pass 
over the professions of husband and wife, so whether they (or their families) were active in similar 
trades and tried to consolidate cooperation by matrimony or merely married out of love, totally 
eludes us. Moreover, it is equally complicated to ascertain the possible economic consequences of 
weddings. While intermarriage between merchant families may point to prolonged cooperation and 
the cementing of business relationships, inscriptions only inform about the marriage itself, not about 
what happened after the families were united. Comparative evidence however can help to identify 
recurring marriage patterns, detect the implicit economic motives of marital alliances and assess the 
probability of mutual benefits.  
 
Finally, even though inscriptions can inform us about some aspects of the economic rationale of 
marriages between merchant families, others will continue to escape us. One major problem is the 
absence of evidence concerning dowry exchanges.8 In patrilocal societies as Rome, women moved 
into a new household. As the labor they provided to the new family not always matched with that of 
a male, dowries were meant to balance the expenses of the newcomer. Anthropological research on 
the economics of dowries has shown that in business communities, dowries can be used in 
essentially two ways. Parents can either offer high dowries to attract sons-in-law of higher status, 
who belonged to families with better commercial networks and assure future business opportunities, 
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or to assure the loyalty of a lower-status son-in-law, especially when the parents have a family 
business but no son of their own to follow in their footsteps.9 Dowries thus always involve some kind 
of financial transfer, an economic aspect of marriage most interesting to ambitious businessmen, 
especially since legally, nothing prevented the husband to use the dowry to finance trading 
ventures.10 Yet, evidence to substantiate the very likely assumption that among Roman merchant 
families dowries were being used as a major asset in constructing marital networks, is missing.  
Equally invisible are the economics of inheritance. Demographic patterns of Roman society, with 
often low levels of survivability, produced early succession in business and lower ratio of direct 
succession, and enhanced the importance of widows as head of a family business and the propensity 
for re-marriage.11 Emancipated daughters and widows may have inherited ships, merchandize, 
production facilities and business contacts which could be useful for future partners, but we lack 
detailed family histories to assess whether or not female relatives of late Roman businessmen were 
attractive marriage partners precisely because of their inheritance. Comparative evidence from early 
modern Europe however confirms the frequency with which merchants’ widows married business 
agents, partners and other associates to secure continuity and preserve the family business.12 This 
strategy has also been traced in ancient Greek financial business, with bankers such as the famous 
Pasion arranging marriages between their widows and managers of the bank.13 We may expect 
similar strategies to have been employed in the Roman business world, but to the best of my 
knowledge, clear evidence so far is absent. 
 
In conclusion, due to the nature of the epigraphic evidence, we will evidently never be able to assess 
the comparative impact of love and economic considerations in marital alliances. We can however 
try and visualize the economic potential of Roman marriages by relying on the abundant analyses of 
matrimonial strategies in other pre-industrial societies. Whenever possible, we will adduce 
comparative evidence to elucidate the scanty information provided by Roman epigraphy and trace 
various patterns suggesting how merchant families tried to sustain wealth, property and connections 
through marriage. 
 
Division of labor in household economies and family businesses 
As in every pre-industrial society, the Roman family matrix was central to the economic organization 
of the household. Every single marriage traditionally allowed a very basic division of labor. Until very 
recently, the most pervasive and historically persistent division is that between men hunting, 
farming, trading, producing objects for the market and providing services, and women taking care of 
the children and domestic needs. For Roman women, much of the day was spent seeing to a variety 
of domestic activities which belong to the economic performance of the household, but do not 
constitute a separate profession: overseeing expenses and managing the domestic budget, 
supervising servants, directing small-scale production (mainly textiles, as indicated by the presence of 
loom weights in most Pompeian houses) and perhaps gardening.14 These female household activities 
usually remain invisible in non-elite families, but allowed male family members to concentrate on 
professions outside the house or in adjacent workshops. 
Yet, this biologically motivated division of labor was supplemented by a purely economic division, in 
which the labor force participation by female partners also included non-domestic activities and 
closely resembled their husbands’ professions. This occupational organization allowed the creation of 
family businesses with husband and wife participating in a common profession. Various forms of 
labor division can be distinguished here. 
 
First, we find several instances in which both marital partners specialized in the same trade, shared 
occupational titles and appear to have been responsible for very similar professional tasks. However, 
these marriages usually do not reflect an economically rational decision to wed someone with the 
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same occupation to start a small-scale family business, but are rather motivated by the social 
background of both partners. Most of these marriages were concluded between freed artisans 
belonging to the same family. Both partners had probably met during serfdom in the same house, 
where they had been taught the same commercial specialization by their master and may even have 
worked together side by side in their master’s shop. They apparently continued their trade after 
manumission, but it seems very likely that the couple kept working for their patron as freed 
representatives instead of independent artisans, an agreement which must have been advantageous 
for both parties. The freedmen were allowed to continue the trade in which they had already 
acquired some expertise and were as dependent agents presented with infrastructure, tools and 
some level of job security. The patron on the other hand could carry on his particular business as 
before. He was familiar with his freedmen’s trustworthiness and business acumen and had no need 
to buy and train new slaves. Moreover, the fact that his former slaves were now officially wedded 
solidified agency relationships as the marriage of two of his agents was likely to ensure the patron 
the continuing presence of a reliable labor force. We can therefore imagine that Roman businessmen 
tried to encourage inner-family marriages between freedmen with the same specialization as some 
kind of guarantee for prolonged cooperation.  
The economic rationale of these marriages is nicely illustrated by an inscription from Rome, 
documenting the activities of the Veturii in the purple trade.15 A certain Veturia Flora dedicated a 
tomb for herself, her husband and colibertus Nicepor (sic), their patron Diogenes and Philargyrus, the 
former slave she and her husband had previously owned. All of them had been working as purpurarii 
in the same shop. It is very likely that Flora and Nicepor were introduced to this trade by Diogenes 
during their serfdom, continued working for their patron after manumission and even had their own 
slave specialize in the same occupation. It is remarkable however that Flora does not denote her 
marriage to Nicepor in the most common way, viz. using the word ‘husband’ (coniunx or a synonym), 
but opts for the expression ‘lived with me’ (vixit mecum). If more fellow ex-slaves who had later 
married left out standard references to matrimony, then numerous other inscriptions in which a 
freed man and woman appear, sharing the same gentilicium and occupational title, may hide a 
similar marriage pattern. The male and female clothes-dealers (vestiarii) belonging to the gens Avilia, 
the jewelers (gemmarii) Babbia Asia and Babbius Regillus and workers in gold-leaf (brattiarii) 
Septicius Apollonius and Septicia Rufa, may all have been marital partners because of a shared 
serfdom in their master’s workshop and a continuing occupation as dependent agents.16 
 
Secondly, various inscriptions again present both partners specializing in the same business, but with 
slightly different responsibilities, because the nature of the trade demands a gender-based division 
of labor.  
In craft-centered professions requiring heavy manual labor, this division regularly coincides with a 
distinction between production on the one hand and the organization of sales and accounting on the 
other. In Torino for instance, an epitaph had been dedicated by Cornelia Venusta for herself and her 
husband P. Aebutius.17 Both are cited as nailers (clavarii), but as the profession of a smith seems to 
be better suited for male laborers, it seems plausible that Venusta was only organizing sales in a 
shop, while Aebutius was responsible for the production of merchandize. The same division of labor 
can explain the presence of two female Fanniae among a list of blacksmiths (ferrarii) in Rome.18 This 
assumed labor division, invisible in inscriptional evidence, can be substantiated by pictorial evidence. 
A famous mid-second century relief of a butcher’s shop presumably shows the husband on the right, 
boning meat on a chopping block, and his wife on the left, writing on tablets and apparently 
managing business accounts.19 This scene perfectly resembles a popular 18th-century German 
porcelain figurine entitled ‘The merchant’s wife’, showing a woman making entries in an account 
book and recording her husband’s business transactions.20  
Itinerant merchants and shop-owners equally benefitted from this kind of labor division. Raising 
children and taking care of the household evidently limited the possibilities of women to engage in a 
trade which required constant travelling, but participation in those aspects of the family business 
which could easily be done at home provided an easy alternative. We can definitely imagine that 
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whenever a merchant travelled to distant markets, his wife stayed behind to manage the shop, 
collect outstanding debts, lend money and continue business transactions. Traces of these activities 
can be found in the small dossier of early 2nd-century papyri relating to the businesswoman 
Berenice.21 Together with her husband Pasion, she appears to have been involved in wine trade, 
running the family business during his trading voyages. She was capable of continuing the trade after 
the death of her husband, which implies she had at least some experience in organizing commercial 
transactions. Moreover, one of the documents was an account of income and expenses written by 
Berenice herself, suggesting she was quite acquainted with commercial book-keeping. Shopkeepers 
too could no doubt rely on their wives to assist in sales and present the merchandize. A 2nd-century 
relief, found in Arlon and called the “Pilier du cultivateur”, illustrates exactly this kind of support. One 
can see a sale scene with a couple behind a counter loaded with fruit and vegetables. The man 
presents a piece to the customer while the woman arranges the merchandize.22 Investing time and 
effort in these aspects of commerce resulted in wives becoming specialized representatives and must 
have caused increasing returns.23 Although many wives of merchants and shopkeepers must have 
been assisting their husband on a daily basis, their specific activities remain invisible in occupational 
epigraphy, for professional titles usually only identify the head or supervisor of the economic unit 
without mentioning his assistants or employees.24 This focus on male labor is aptly illustrated by an 
inscription with relief from Salona.25 The text only refers to Asidonius Agatopus as candlestick-maker 
(ceriolarius), but the relief shows the couple together at work. Quite exceptionally, the inscription 
here explicitly hints at the cooperation between husband and wife, by stating that ‘they worked 
together well’ (qui in se bene lavoraverunt [sic]), but nevertheless only presents the man with an 
occupational title. This exemplary document clearly suggests how many merchants’ wives must have 
been helping their husband in his trade but yet continue to escape our attention. Only a handful of 
inscriptions break the overall pattern and state only a profession for the female partner and not for 
the husband. This mostly involves occupations in which women tend to dominate, such as cooking, 
small-scale trade in victuals in booths and stalls and specialized textile trade.26 
 
Marriage as the connection between merchant families and networks 
From the economic benefits of marriage within a single family, we now shift the focus to Roman 
merchant families who used marriage as a strategy to link common interests. In most pre-modern 
societies, it was usual for merchant families to create marital alliances with colleagues in business to 
ensure close cooperation, facilitate the spread of information and training and thus reduce common 
trading risks.27 Marriages very often initiated a sequence of commercial partnerships between 
merchant families, in which a clear division of labor was respected. The son-in-law was presented 
with business training and an introduction to new commercial networks and initially only plays a 
subordinate role by managing the practicalities of trading ventures, such as travels, payments and 
transport. His family-in-law on the other hand was responsible for the organizational side of business 
operations, such as deciding on new purchases, maintaining correspondence with partners abroad 
and accounting.28 This strategy proved to be a real success. Ågren for instance has shown how in 
18th-century Stockholm, merchants aligned to other business families ended up far more prosperous 
than those who had been married to families without commercial interests.29 
This section will argue that even though the lack of merchant letters and archives will never allow us 
to present a picture of ancient trade in the same detail as has been done for medieval and early 
modern Europe, Roman businessmen nevertheless essentially relied on very similar techniques to 
forge efficient and profitable networks. We will distinguish between marital connections created on 




Local family networks 
In most Roman cities, merchants must have formed various local economic networks inside the 
town, with the surrounding hinterland and neighboring towns as well. This set of connections was 
utilized to spread information and knowledge, facilitate transactions and mobilize capital. While 
networks can be construed in a variety of different ways, strategic marriages belonged to the most 
important strategies to strengthen previous relationships or expand the already existing connections. 
Two main motives for commercial marriages can be discerned. 
 
First, most strategic matrimonies took place between families with similar trading interests and of 
corresponding status in the local community. They primarily served the accumulation of wealth, the 
concentration of contacts and hence the consolidation of a dominating position in the business 
world. These alliances can be traced in both commerce and crafts. 
A good example from the first economic sector is the marital connection between the Apronii and 
Helvii, two elite families engaged in trade and transport in late 1st, early 2nd-century Lyon. C. 
Apronius Raptor, a citizen and council member of Trier, had settled in Lyon to become a prime 
member of the local associations of wine merchants (negotiatores vinarii) and barge skippers on the 
Saône (nautae Ararici) and eventually was elected patron of both collegia.30 Two inscriptions from 
the neighboring city of Grenoble show that a female member of this family, Apronia Casata, had 
been married to P. Helvius Masso, a council member in Vienne.31 Masso was no doubt related to L. 
Helvius Frugi, who likewise had a seat in the Vienne city council, but, more importantly, also 
belonged to the same association of barge skippers as Apronius Raptor and was elected patron as 
well.32 It seems very likely that these two aristocratic merchant families, whose wealth and social 
prominence is exemplified by Raptor and Frugi being elected patrons, cemented their cooperation 
and supremacy in the wine trade by intermarriage. The Apronii may even have continued this 
strategy during the 2nd half of the 2nd century, as suggested by a very fragmentary funerary 
inscription from Lyon mentioning a certain Toutia Aproniana.33 Her cognomen may have been 
derived from her mother’s gentilicium, Apronia, while her own, very rare name Toutia can link her to 
Toutius Incitatus, a Lyonese grain merchant and again barge skipper on the Saône.34 This small 
dossier clearly suggests that the Apronii tried to interconnect with several families active in the same 
trade. 
Very similar considerations must also have motivated the marital connections between two craft 
families from Rome. Several inscriptions indicate that family members of the Durden(i)i specialized in 
the production and sale of metal vessels. A certain P. Durdenus Eros erected a tomb for his brother, a 
vascularius.35 The freedmen P. Durdenius Acutus and Durdenia Prima must have been active in the 
same trade as well. Even though the epitaph commemorating their death fails to cite their 
profession, the stone was decorated by small vessels, suggesting the couple was also working as 
vascularii.36 The importance of marital connections for this family of artisans is finally shown by the 
epitaph dedicated by the freedwoman Durdena P.l. Cytheris and her husband L. Maelius L.l. 
Thamyrus, who was also operating as a vascularius.37 
 
Secondly, we also have to consider marriages between families with different, yet somehow 
interrelated professions. The main motive of this kind of alliances is not an increase in scale or 
ascendancy in a single trade, but the creation of useful connections which can mutually support each 
family’s business interests.  
This category first contains marriages between merchant families active in trade and families 
managing transport facilities. The small dossier of the Gallic gens Maspetia shows how marriages 
were used to forge links between families engaged in various trades and riverine transport.38 In Lyon, 
two epitaphs mention the marriage of a Maspetia with a local businessman. The first inscription was 
dedicated by Maspetia Silvina to the memory of her husband Valerius Messor, ‘who was doing 
business in the Canabae district’ (qui gessit in Canabis).39 Given Lyon’s central place in the Gallic wine 
trade, Messor may have been active as a resident wine merchant in the city’s commercial quarter. 
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The second inscription was erected by Q. Maspetius Severianus for his son-in-law L. Hilarianius 
Cinnamus, an oil merchant and barge skipper on the Rhône (negotiator olearius and nauta 
Rhodanicus).40 Moreover, the marital ties between the Maspetii and Hilarianii seem to have been 
cemented by a second matrimony, this time between Maspetia Sabina and L. Hilarianius Martidius.41 
This couple however was living in Arles and we can imagine that Martidius was assisting in Cinnamus’ 
business by organizing commercial transactions in the harbor, before the merchandize was shipped 
along the Rhône to Lyon. Thus, even though we have no further indication of the Maspetii’s 
involvement in commerce, the marriages they concluded with merchants and shippers operating 
along the Rhône suggest they heavily invested in trade and transport. With the Hilarianii’s 
specialization in the import of Mediterranean merchandize (oil) and presence in a Mediterranean 
harbor, and with Cinnamus’ shipping facilities and Valerius Messor’s presence in the Canabae, 
providing a connection to the Lyonese market, the Maspetii must have been able to monitor 
maritime and riverine trade and transport. Yet, this strategy was not only used in riverine commerce. 
Connections between families engaged in maritime commerce and others organizing land transport 
proved to be equally efficient. The economic rationale of these matrimonial ties is obvious: shippers 
importing merchandize to a port city benefit from a network connecting them to those people 
responsible for the further distribution to markets and customers inland. The connections between 
the Censorinii and Capitonii can illustrate this strategy. Q. Capitonius Probatus, a Lyonese shipper 
(navicularius marinus), was doing business between Gaul and Italy.42 As clearly indicated by the fact 
that he was elected sevir augustalis in both Lyon and Puteoli, an honorary religious function often 
awarded to wealthy merchants and artisans, he must have had commercial interests in both cities 
and was no doubt shipping merchandize purchased in Puteoli to markets in Gaul and beyond.43 The 
gentilicium Capitonius is fairly rare but was nonetheless encountered a second time in Lyon, in an 
epitaph dedicated by L. Capitonius Pius to his late wife Censorinia Supera.44 Her name is otherwise 
unknown in Lyon, but can be related to L. Censorinius Ibliomarus, a citizen from Trier and member of 
an association of utriclarii.45 This collegium was responsible for transporting wine and other liquids 
from southern Gaul to the northern provinces, by storing the merchandize in hides and packing these 
on mules.46 Ibliomarus erected his dedicatory inscription in Bard-le-Regulier, a small town located 
approximately half-way between Lyon and the region of the Treveri. We can imagine that Capitonius 
Probatus relied on this marital connection to have his merchandize transported from Lyon to 
customers living in the German provinces.  
Next, we also find marital ties between families with land-based commercial interests and others 
organizing land transport to distant markets. Three families from Grenoble, the Atisii, Devillii and 
Iulii, whose marital patterns have been analyzed by Wierschowski, present a remarkable example.47 
All these families, which were most likely exporting wine to Italy and beyond, married their 
daughters to families living in the neighboring regions of the Alps. They may have wished to establish 
close connections with families engaged in local land transport across the mountainous regions of 
south-east Gaul and northern Italy, to have their merchandize safely and cheaply transported to 
Mediterranean markets. It has indeed previously been argued that part of the wealth generated by 
the elite families of this region was based on their close involvement with the negotiatores Cisalpini 
et Transalpini, who specialized in transporting merchandize through the Alpine region.48 
Thirdly, economically motivated connections can also be forged between families supplying the same 
markets, but with a focus on different merchandize. Marital ties can then facilitate the spread of 
information on particular demands and the trustworthiness of customers frequenting this specific 
market. An example can be found in the manufactures destined for the military markets along the 
northern frontiers. The constant demand for military cloaks (saga) encouraged many Gallic 
businessmen to specialize in this trade and even caused the creation of a professional organization of 
sagarii with a seat in Lyon.49 Two of these cloak-dealers, C. Rusonius Secundus and C. Rusonius 
Myron, were fellow-freedmen and belonged to a family only rarely occurring in epigraphy.50 Yet, an 
epitaph discovered in Reims mentions a certain Rusonia Nonna, married to Maianus, who was a 
helmet-maker (cassidarius).51 He was no doubt supplying the same military markets as the Rusonii 
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from Lyon, so his decision to marry Rusonia may partially have been motivated by common business 
interests. 
A fourth possible scenario involves connections between families responsible for the production and 
sale of a particular ingredient, necessary in another trade, and families dealing in the finished 
products. The former benefit from this alliance because they can expect regular sales to familiar 
customers, while the latter may perhaps anticipate price reductions, guaranteed quality products 
and other privileges in purchasing merchandize. An example of this marital strategy can be found in 
the Roman textile industry. In the capital, the purple dye industry and trade seems to have been 
dominated by freed members of the Veturii, who ran multiple shops in at least two different 
locations (purpurarii).52 One member of this family, a Veturia Deutera, was married to C. Cafurnius 
Antiochus, a woolen-draper (lanarius) who may have used the purple dyes in the production of his 
textiles.53 
A final pattern of commercial marriages, which closely resembles the previous one, connects families 
producing and/or distributing a particular kind of merchandize with families producing the containers 
in which these products are stored. The mutual advantages are very similar to the ones of the 
previous category and include the reduction of market insecurity and the creation of trust among 
business partners. For this strategy, the Spanish olive oil trade can offer an illustrative case. Around 
the middle of the 2nd century, the name of L. Aelius Aelianus is cited in several tituli picti on Dr. 20 oil 
amphorae, so we can safely assume he was shipping oil to Rome.54 Yet, he is also known as a wealthy 
municipal aristocrat and benefactor in Sevilla, donating statues and public meals to his fellow-
citizens.55 Aelianus belonged to one of the major business families engaged in the Spanish oil export: 
Aelii frequently occur in tituli picti  and , documenting their involvement in the distribution and 
production of olive oil, and in stamps on amphorae, which attest their investments in the production 
of vessels.56 As a member of the local elite in Sevilla, Aelianus no doubt possessed estates in the near 
vicinity of the city, which very likely were used to cultivate olive trees. It thus seems very likely that 
he was (partially) exporting own produce to the capital. So far however, none of the stamps on Dr. 20 
amphorae corresponds to his name or initials, suggesting that he was not involved in the production 
of containers. His wife Egnatia Lupercilla, however, was the daughter of a M. Egnatius, whose initials 
were found on stamps, produced in a figlina in Alcolea del Río.57 It seems at least possible that the 
marital ties between the Aelii and Egnatii facilitated Aelianus’ export business, because he was not 
required to invest in amphora production himself, but could rely on the vessels manufactured in the 
workshops of his family-in-law.  
 
Interregional family networks 
In the following section, we focus on interregional commerce and the importance of marriage in the 
organization of business abroad. When travelling to distant markets, trading risks already existing in 
local business ventures evidently multiplied. For newcomers in business communities abroad, the 
difficulties of finding trustworthy resident trading partners and gathering reliable information on 
local commerce must have been enormous and the risk of being cheated may have deterred 
merchants from venturing into new markets. The best way to reduce these trading hazards and 
hence expand business abroad was finding, and above all, keeping a distinct place in the local 
business community.58 One strategy immigrants could try to gain access to already existing 
commercial networks was creating marital ties with local merchant families. The social capital and 
credit constructed by matrimony were then likely to introduce them to reliable colleagues, to create 
new opportunities and eventually convert the family ties into business advantages. 
We can again distinguish between two different versions of this strategy. 
 
First, epigraphy shows how foreign merchants regularly settled in the markets they were supplying 
and tried to forge marital ties with local business families. This kind of marital alliances allowed an 
efficient division of labor, in which the foreign merchant organized the import of merchandize 
produced in his homeland, and his family-in-law took care of further distribution. The career and 
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professional mobility of P. Clodius Athenio, a mid-2nd-century merchant, may be a case in point. 
Athenio most likely originated from the Spanish city of Malaga, where he was known as a wealthy 
benefactor and quinquennalis of the local merchant association.59 He was exporting one of the most 
famous Spanish victuals, salted fish products, to Rome (negotians salsarius) and at some point 
appears to have settled in the capital, as he was eventually buried there.60 He married a certain 
Scantia Successa, who belonged to a family well-attested in Italian epigraphy, but completely absent 
in the Spanish provinces. During the 1st century, two Scantii were operating in Rome as merchants 
(mercatores).61 One can imagine that the Scantii continued their business during the 2nd century and 
married a female member to a wealthy Spanish businessman focusing on the Roman market. 
Merchants probably also stimulated (or forced) their intermediaries and agents to apply the same 
strategy in foreign markets. When merchant families were sufficiently large to monitor several 
representatives in harbors abroad, these agents may have used marriage with natives as a technique 
to promote quick integration in the local trading community. This strategy seems to be described in a 
fragment of the Periplus maris Erythraei, which refers to merchants from Muza sending shippers and 
agents to Rhapta, who then through intermarriage became acquainted with the area and its 
language.62 
 
Secondly, we can also trace how immigrant merchants settle in distant trading hubs and marry a 
partner belonging to another foreign business family. This particular technique has the obvious 
advantage that it tries to blend the benefits of two strategies: this way merchants are introduced in 
the other family members’ local networks and the networks they cultivate in their homeland. Two 
variants can be distinguished.  
This strategy was first employed by merchant families who originated from the same area and both 
had settled in a major commercial center.63 By using intermarriage as a means to connect the two 
families, they expand the available networks in their new home city but also intensify the commercial 
contacts in their homeland. A good example can be found in the marital ties between two small 
Celtic families, the Cotisii and Gesatii, who specialized in the same trade and supplied the same 
market. The commercial interests of the Cotisii are clearly indicated by a seal, discovered recently in 
a Roman villa in Le Castellet, a city in southern France, and engraved with the name M(arci) Cotisi 
Bubali, which probably identified the owner of the estate.64 The object was produced in the shape of 
a ship, suggesting the family engaged in maritime trade. This hypothesis can be corroborated by the 
fact that the very rare gentilicium also appears in two tituli picti on Spanish oil amphorae, found in 
Rome.65 The Cotisii were apparently supplying the capital with Baetican olive oil. The Gesatii 
specialized in exactly the same business, for tituli picti present the names of at least 3 Gesatii.66 Both 
families seem to have encouraged family members to settle in Rome, evidently to organize local 
distribution of the imported oil.67 More important however is a single epitaph found in Ostia, 
documenting the marriage between a Gesatia Macrina and M. Cotisius Alexio.68 Given the extreme 
rarity of both gentilicia, we can hardly doubt that the inscription attests the marital alliance of two 
Gallic families, active in the same trade and focusing on a single market, who wished to merge 
commercial networks. The same strategy may have been used by other families supplying the capital 
with Spanish oil and may have motivated the connections between two of the most important 
families in this trade, the CC. Valerii and DD. Caecilii.69 Both families had several members active in 
the export of Spanish oil and it may not be coincidental that an epitaph from Rome documents the 
marriage of the daughter of Valerius Onesimus, whose name features in the tituli picti, and a D. 
Caecilius, whose cognomen is sadly missing.70 It is true that the gentilicia are far more common than 
those of the Gallic merchant families, which obviously complicates identification, but nevertheless, 
the marital ties connecting the Valerii and Caecilii would answer to the same economic rationale. 
Next, we also find traces of merchant families who had travelled from completely different regions to 
a single trading hub and, once settled there, tried to interconnect the business networks existing in 
their native regions with the shared networks in the commercial center.71 This gives them the 
opportunity to progress business interests in the emporium they had settled in by relying on 
common business contacts, but also to explore new markets abroad and interact with a large variety 
 
10 
of colleagues in distant business communities by using the newly made connections. Several 
examples of this strategy can be found in the epigraphy of the Republican trading hub par excellence, 
Delos. Many Italian negotiatores who had settled on the island to organize the slave trade appear to 
have forged connections with Phoenician business families, also present in the same commercial 
quarter. A certain C. Seius Aristomachus for instance dedicated a statue to his mother Cleopatra, a 
citizen of Arados.72 The funerary monument of a daughter of Q. Furius and Artemisia was found 
among the epitaphs of a Tyrian family, suggesting Furius had married a member of a Phoenician 
merchant family.73 It would be interesting to analyze the marital patterns of the children born from 
these ‘mixed marriages’. Comparative evidence suggests that during the first generation, foreign 
merchants who had settled in distant ports tended to marry women belonging to other immigrant 
business families who often specialized in similar trades, a strategy also followed by Italian 
negotiatores. Later generations however increasingly opted for marriages with local families, to 
promote integration into local business networks which had been dominated by native merchant 
families.74 So far however, Delian epigraphy does not allow us to trace marital patterns over several 
generations and verify whether similar techniques were being used by Roman businessmen.  
 
Marriage as a socio-economic strategy or connecting wealth and status 
After the analysis of strategic marriages with a purely economic motivation, this final section will 
explore how marriages with higher-status partners not only stimulated a merchant family’s rise in 
society, but may also have had economic repercussions. 
 
In societies with a clearly marked social stratification, as Rome undoubtedly was, marriage patterns 
tend to be rather conservative and closed, in the sense that status groups usually married each 
other, either to stabilize their privileged position by recycling dowries or because social mobility 
through marriage was impeded by superior elite families and peers. Nonetheless, we do find traces 
of businessmen and their families successfully engaging in marriages with social superiors, albeit the 
frequency of these cross-status marriages was obviously never so high as to actually blur class 
divisions. While in the majority of these marital alliances the socially inferior partners must primarily 
have sought to maximize prestige and gain access to the local aristocracy, upward social mobility also 
affected the professional life of the partners. For businessmen, marrying a member of the elite also 
facilitated the accumulation of wealth and the creation of new economic opportunities, as they are 
now introduced to a completely new network of potential customers and mediators who can offer 
assistance, credit and valuable relationships. Unfortunately, Roman inscriptions never allow us to 
reconstruct the variety of new opportunities opened up by marriage and the economic consequences 
of gaining access to a new status group. We can only rely on comparative evidence from better-
documented pre-industrial societies and assume that Roman businessmen who were introduced to 
these elite networks somehow equally benefitted from their marital ties.75 Here we will analyze two 
different strategies by which businessmen tried to gain access to Roman aristocracies.  
 
First, successful businessmen who had gathered at least sufficient wealth and status to be deemed 
an acceptable marriage partner, sometimes managed to wed a woman belonging to the local and 
even imperial elites. P. Tutilius Callifon for instance, a freed merchant and banker (negotiator and 
stipulator argentarius) from Milan, managed to marry Iunia Publicia C.f. Pomponia, a femina stolata 
and hence an individual of equestrian rank, whose family was probably living in Como.76 He must 
have been a rather prominent figure in the city, for he was awarded the honorary function of sevir 
and elected patron twice. Whether these status markers were granted to him as a consequence of 
his marriage or merely enabled him to find a socially superior partner must remain uncertain. 
However, it is interesting to note that the inscription was dedicated by two of the couple’s clients, a 
certain L. Romatius Valerianus and Vocatia Valeria. Romatius’ rare gentilicium occurs, apart from this 
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inscription and a single document from Cingoli, exclusively in the epigraphy of Como.77 It is thus 
obvious that the regulation of patronage relationships was the responsibility of Callifon’s wife and 
her family’s prestige, not that of the successful merchant. As Callifon was connected to the Publicii’s 
clients by his marriage to a member of the ordo equester, we can assume he must have benefitted 
from the access to this network in Como. Maybe some of these clients were involved in the thriving 
transport business on lake Como, by which route merchandize was shipped from regions across the 
Alps to northern Italy.78 Callifon may then have relied on his connections in Como to distribute the 
merchandize on the markets of Milan. This assumed economic connection between Como and Milan 
is further exemplified by the career of one of the Romatii from Como, who held the function of sevir 
in both Como and Milan and sevir augustalis in Como, an honorary office which, as already noted, 
was often granted to freedmen engaged in trade and industry.79 It seems fairly certain he must have 
been one of the nodes in the commercial, marital and patronage network linking the equestrian 
Publicii from Como with Callifon’s business in Milan. 
A second strategy successfully employed by wealthy merchants was not marrying into elite families 
themselves, but to marry off their children to members of aristocracies. In virtually all pre-industrial 
societies, marriages of this kind were often concluded between rich and ambitious business families 
and impoverished elites faced with insolvency.80 They provided an adequate match between the wish 
for upward social mobility and the demand for hard cash to finance the lifestyle of the (formerly) rich 
and famous. In Roman society, this option may even have been more attractive to elites than the 
first, for it effectively increases the distance between direct engagement in commerce and the 
traditional values of the landed aristocracy, aversive as ever to close connections with the world of 
trade and industry. A suitable example of this strategy can be found in the business community of 
Narbonne, where the wealthy oil merchant and local aristocrat Sex. Fadius Secundus Musa managed 
to marry off one of his children to a person of senatorial rank.81 Several tituli picti, dated between 
146 and 161 AD, identify Musa as a trader shipping Spanish olive oil to Rome.82 Moreover, a famous 
honorary inscription from Narbonne, carefully dated in 149 AD, describes how Musa had held all 
municipal offices, had been elected patron of a local carpenters’ association and had made a very 
generous donation of 16,000 sesterces to the collegium.83 The text also includes the transcription of 
a letter Musa had addressed to the association, in which he refers to his grandson Iucundus, a 
clarissimus. This title clearly suggests that Iucundus’ parents, and hence one of Musa’s children, 
belonged to the ordo senatorius. The economic consequences of this marital alliance are evidently 
never alluded to, but one can assume that a senator with obvious connections in the capital, 




The analysis of marriage patterns among merchant families clearly suggests that these strategies 
really mattered in setting up a successful business. We are obviously unable to compute the real 
impact of marriage in economics because of the lack of financial records, but nonetheless, the 
recurrence of marital alliances between businessmen indicates that somehow marriage offered real 
benefits to merchants who interlinked with colleagues through marriage connections. Moreover, 
comparative evidence has been adduced to claim that Roman businessmen essentially relied on the 
same nuptial strategies traceable in all pre-industrial trading communities. Here, sufficient sources 
are available to confirm the importance of finding the right marital partner to create business 
opportunities, gain access to trading networks, reduce risks in a volatile trading world and eventually 
get a competitive advantage. All the similarities between ancient and early modern merchant 
networks forged by marital ties clearly prove that Roman businessmen were well-aware of the 
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